Who is el paso corp

In the Eagle Ford, El Paso has , net acres, with about 60 percent of them in areas considered rich with more valuable oil and natural gas liquids.

In Utah's Altamont field, El Paso has about , net acres. It plans to use enhanced oil recovery techniques, like CO2 injection and infill drilling, to boost production in the coming years.

Analysts are not of one mind on an El Paso split. El Paso's focus on oil production growth makes sense given how much more oil is getting on the market compared to natural gas, Hammond said.

Most Popular. These Texas companies ranked among the best employers of veterans. Multiple Texas companies have made the list of employers that are making efforts to support current and former military personnel. New EV startup hoping to challenge Tesla goes public. Illegal air pollution in Texas fell 54 percent in By Mella McEwen mmcewen mrt. VKGC operates a large natural gas gathering system extending more than miles into the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Louisiana.

Destin owns a large natural gas gathering system extending more than miles into the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Louisiana. Sonat owns a one-third membership interest in Destin and operates the pipeline owned by Destin. The draft complaint alleges that the post-merger market would be highly concentrated, and that the acquisition would substantially increase concentration in the market.

The acquisition would increase the HHI in the geographic market by over points to over The draft complaint alleges that the effect of the acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the transportation of natural gas out of producing fields in the relevant section of the country by eliminating actual and potential competition between El Paso and Sonat; by eliminating actual and potential competition among competitors generally; and by increasing concentration in the transportation of natural gas out of producing fields in the relevant section of the country, therefore increasing the likelihood of collusion.

The draft complaint further alleges that entry would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to prevent anticompetitive effects in the relevant market. Transportation of Natural Gas into Gas Consuming Areas The draft complaint alleges that a relevant line of commerce is the transportation of natural gas into gas consuming areas and a relevant section of the country is eastern Tennessee and northern Georgia and submarkets thereof.

This region includes the metropolitan areas of Atlanta, Georgia and Chattanooga and Knoxville, Tennessee. Customers in this area of the country purchase contracts for the transportation and delivery of over million cubic feet of natural gas per day. El Paso and Sonat are direct and substantial competitors in the business of transporting natural gas into this section of the country. El Paso's Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company owns and operates a large natural gas transmission system extending from producing fields in the Gulf of Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana through several states in the southern United States, including Tennessee, and on into the northern United States.

ETNG transports natural gas received from Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, and from other sources, to many local gas distribution utilities in eastern Tennessee and northern Georgia.

Sonat owns Southern Natural Gas Company, which owns and operates a large natural gas transmission system extending from producing fields in the Gulf of Mexico and Louisiana through several states in the southern United States, including Georgia and Tennessee. Sonat, either directly, or via interconnection with East Tennessee Natural Gas, transports natural gas for many local gas distribution utilities in eastern Tennessee and northern Georgia.

El Paso offered reduced transportation rates to local gas distribution utilities located in eastern Tennessee in response to a threat by Sonat to by-pass ETNG by extending its own pipeline. In the least concentrated submarket of the geographic market, the acquisition would increase the HHI by over points to over In certain other submarkets, the acquisition would increase the HHI by over points to The draft complaint alleges that the effect of the acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the transportation of natural gas into the relevant section of the country by eliminating actual and potential competition between El Paso and Sonat; by eliminating actual and potential competition among competitors generally; and by increasing concentration in the transportation of natural gas into the relevant section of the country, therefore increasing the likelihood of collusion.

The draft complaint further alleges that entry would not be timely, likely or sufficient to prevent anticompetitive effects in the relevant markets. The proposed consent order is designed to remedy the Commission's competitive concerns about the proposed acquisition.

To solve the competitive concerns in the onshore markets, the proposed consent order requires El Paso to divest ETNG, the owner of the El Paso system that serves cities in east Tennessee and northern Georgia. To solve the competitive concerns offshore, the proposed order requires El Paso to divest Sea Robin a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sonat and Sonat's 33 percent interest in Destin.

The proposed consent order requires divestiture of the relevant assets within six months of the date on which the consent agreement was signed at no minimum price to a buyer and in a manner that are approved by the Commission. In the event divestiture has not occurred within six months, the proposed order provides that the Commission may appoint a trustee to divest the assets. The proposed order does not require that El Paso present the Commission with a buyer of the assets to be divested before acceptance of the proposed consent agreement for public comment an "up-front buyer" because El Paso has satisfied the Commission that, in this instance, consumers will not be harmed by a post-order divestiture.

In some cases the Commission has required a respondent to divest "crown jewel" assets in the event the respondent fails to divest a narrower package of assets promptly. Such a crown jewel is unnecessary in this case.

El Paso has agreed to divest a package of assets that includes ETNG and Sea Robin in their entirety, which should help ensure that the divestiture will convey a saleable and competitively viable set of assets. This will increase the likelihood of finding a buyer acceptable to the Commission in a timely manner. Therefore, the proposed divestiture should readily suffice to remedy consumer harm. The proposed order contains ancillary provisions in both the onshore and offshore markets.

The proposed order extends the renewal deadline for these contracts until 60 days following the divestiture of ETNG, provides customers the option of extending the expiration dates of these contracts, and allows customers to terminate certain other ETNG and Tennessee Gas Pipeline contracts entered into as the proposed divestiture process is underway.

The purpose of these provisions is to permit the customer to know the identity of the acquirer of ETNG before having to commit to new contracts for transportation or storage either on ETNG or, more significantly, on the trunklines that transport the gas from the Gulf of Mexico into ETNG. The Commission anticipates that the acquirer of ETNG will open additional interconnections with trunklines that currently intersect with the ETNG system so as to provide customers with alternative routes for gas supply.

The tolling provision will give customers the option of using these new sources if they so choose. The proposed order also contains ancillary provisions regarding VKGC which are in effect in the event Sonat's Destin interest is sold to a natural gas producer. The sale of Sonat's interest to a producer could result in Destin's being less than fully competitive in certain instances in which the producer elected to serve its own producing interests by reserving one part of the Destin system at the expense of independent producers seeking access to certain other parts of the Destin system.

To remedy the potential for the divestiture to have this anticompetitive result, the proposed consent order requires El Paso to cause VKGC to adhere to benchmarks established by competition between VKGC and Destin.